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1.	Introduction	
	
Some	philosophical	controversies	never	die.	The	debate	about	the	interpretation	of	preferences	and	utility1	
in	economics	flared	up	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century;2	in	the	1940s	and	1950s	economists	seemed	to	
converge	 on	 a	 shared	 interpretation,	 but	 the	 consensus	 was	 fragile:	 with	 the	 rise	 of	 behavioural	 and	
experimental	economics,	the	controversy	has	restarted	forcefully	during	the	past	decade.3	The	main	bone	of	
contention	 is	whether	preferences	and	utility	should	be	given	a	behavioural	or	mental	 interpretation.	Do	
these	 theoretical	 constructs	 refer	 to	overt	 behaviour,	 patterns	of	 choice	 that	 are	 readily	 observable	 and	
intersubjectively	measurable?	Or	should	we	take	them	to	describe	psychological	states,	hidden	in	the	minds	
of	decision	makers?	
	 These	are	generally	assumed	to	be	the	only	plausible	interpretations.	But	the	assumption	is	dubious:	
in	the	next	few	pages	I	will	make	a	proposal	that	cuts	across	the	behavioural/mental	dichotomy	and	tries	to	
reconcile	the	interpretation	of	preferences	with	the	best	scientific	practice	in	economics.	I	will	argue	that	the	
two	standard	positions	in	this	debate	–	‘behaviourism’	and	‘mentalism’	–	are	to	be	rejected.	Preferences	in	
the	 economic	 theory	 of	 choice	 are	 dispositions	 that	 can	 be	 realised	 in	 different	ways	 depending	 on	 the	
circumstances	of	choice	and	on	the	characteristics	of	the	decision-maker.	I	will	argue	that	this	claim	does	not	
imply	a	commitment	to	a	behaviourist	interpretation	of	preferences	–	on	the	contrary	it	is	compatible	with	
the	idea	that	psychology	plays	an	important	role	in	choice	theory.	But	it	does	not	imply	that	preferences	are	
to	be	 transformed	 into	psychological	 constructs,	 in	 spite	of	what	 some	economists	advocate	 (and	others	
dread).	
	 The	argument	relies	crucially	on	multiple	realisation,	and	on	the	‘wide’	applicability	of	choice	theory	
beyond	the	domain	of	human	individual	decision	making.	This	in	turn	requires	that	‘preference’	is	given	an	
abstract	interpretation,	along	the	same	lines	as	concepts	like	‘force’	in	physics	or	‘fitness’	in	biology.	In	physics	
the	discovery	that	there	are	different	kinds	of	forces	prompted	the	development	of	different	theories,	such	
as	electromagnetism,	that	now	complement	the	traditional	theory	of	gravitation.	Similarly,	different	theories	
of	preferences	ought	to	explain	the	preferences	of	decision	units	whose	internal	processes	are	unlikely	to	be	
explicated	by	the	principles	of	human	psychology.	
	 The	discussion	will	proceed	as	 follows:	section	two	summarises	classic	behaviourism	and	explains	
why	 it	 is	 untenable.	 This	 section	 is	 relatively	 short	 and	 unoriginal.	 It	 will	 outline	 what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 the	
                                                
1	 Although	I	will	use	the	term	‘preference’	more	frequently,	I	will	take	preferences	and	utility	to	be	roughly	
synonymous,	in	line	with	the	standard	terminology	of	contemporary	choice	theorists	(a	utility	function	is	an	index	
of	preferences). 
2	 Historical	reconstructions	of	key	aspects	of	the	old	controversy	can	be	found	in	Lewin	(1996),	Bruni	and	Sugden	
(2007),	Edwards	(2016),	Moscati	(2018,	forthcoming). 
3	 An	incomplete	list	of	contributions	to	the	recent	debate	includes	Hausman	(2000;	2008;	2012),	Mongin	(2000a),	
Dowding	(2002),	Binmore	(2004),	Glimcher	et	al	(2005),	Ross	(2005;	2011;	2014),	Camerer	(2008),	Gul	and	
Pesendorfer	(2008),	Hands	(2009;	2013;	2014),	Vromen	(2010),	Lehtinen	(2011),	Guala	(2012),	Fumagalli	(2013),	
Clarke	(2016),	Dietrich	and	List	(2016),	Okasha	(2016),	Engelen	(2017),	Angner	(2018),	Nagatsu	and	Poder	
(forthcoming),	Cozic	(unpublished). 
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fundamental	 flaw	 of	 behaviourism,	 refer	 to	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 and	 save	 space	 for	 the	 discussion	 of	
mentalism	in	the	subsequent	sections.	Section	three	introduces	a	prominent	approach	to	the	identification	
of	mental	 states	 –	 functionalism	 –	 and	 explains	 why	 it	 fails	 to	 capture	 economists’	 concerns	 about	 the	
psychologisation	of	choice	theory.	Section	four	explains	what	role	preferences	play	in	economic	explanations	
of	behaviour,	in	dispositional	terms.	Section	five	shows	that	this	interpretation	is	consistent	with	scientific	
practice	in	behavioural	economics,	focusing	on	the	case	of	Prospect	Theory.	The	key	argument	against	the	
behavioural-mental	dichotomy	is	presented	in	section	six,	where	I	illustrate	how	intransitive	preferences	can	
be	multiply	realised,	using	examples	from	human	decision	making	and	committee	deliberation.	Section	seven	
summarises	the	argument	and	concludes	the	paper.	
	
2.	Background:	why	preferences	are	not	behaviour	
	
The	interpretation	of	preferences	and	utility	that	became	orthodox	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century	is	
a	 direct	 descendant	 of	 philosophical	 ‘positivism’.	 Positivism,	 to	 be	 sure,	 took	 various	 forms:	while	 bland	
positivists	merely	stressed	the	importance	of	empirical	evidence	for	the	production	of	knowledge,	radical	
ones	 advocated	 the	 elimination	 of	 all	 scientific	 terms	 that	 are	 directly	 unobservable	 or	 irreducible	 to	
observable	 concepts.	 In	 physics,	 for	 example,	 operationalists	 tried	 to	 reduce	 the	meaning	 of	 theoretical	
statements	to	the	set	of	actions	that	scientists	perform	when	they	measure	a	parameter	in	the	laboratory	
(e.g.	 Bridgman	1927).	An	electron	 according	 to	 this	 interpretation	 is	 not	 a	 small	 particle	with	 a	negative	
electric	charge,	but	the	set	of	operations	we	perform	when	we	observe,	say,	tracks	in	a	bubble	chamber.	In	
psychology,	 behaviourists	 aimed	 at	 re-interpreting	 every	 psychological	 concept	 in	 terms	 of	 measurable	
behaviour	(e.g.	Watson	and	McDougall	1929).	Terms	like	‘hunger’	or	‘pain’	were	supposed	to	be	replaced	by	
laws	that	connect	external	physical	stimuli	(like	food	deprivation)	with	overt	behaviour	(like	food	seeking).	
	 Similar	 ideas	 played	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 choice	 theory,	 where	 positivistic-minded	 economists	
attempted	(1)	to	replace	‘psychophysical’	utility	(pleasure)	with	an	index	of	preferences;	and	(2)	to	reduce	
preferences	to	observed	choice	(behaviour).	The	first	part	of	the	programme	was	accomplished	by	various	
theorists	(notably	Pareto	1906,	and	Hicks	1939)	over	the	course	of	thirty	years,	and	has	become	a	pillar	of	
modern	 microeconomics.	 The	 second	 part,	 in	 contrast,	 proved	 to	 be	 more	 problematic	 right	 from	 the	
beginning,	and	led	to	ambiguities	that	still	hamper	contemporary	discussions	on	the	status	of	preferences.	
	 The	best	known	application	of	behaviourism	in	economics	is	Paul	Samuelson’s	theory	of	‘revealed	
preferences’	(Samuelson	1938,	1948,	1950).	Samuelson’s	work	was	partly	motivated	by	his	dissatisfaction	
with	Pareto’s	and	Hicks’	preference	theory.	Samuelson	presented	his	proposal	as	a	‘direct	attack	upon	the	
problem,	 dropping	 off	 the	 last	 vestiges	 of	 the	 utility	 analysis’	 (Samuelson	 1938:	 62).	 Taking	 choice	 as	
primitive,	he	showed	that	the	standard	analysis	of	consumer’s	behaviour	(Neoclassical	demand	theory)	only	
requires	a	simple	restriction	(the	‘weak’	axiom	of	revealed	preferences)	on	agents’	choices:	‘if	an	individual	
selects	batch	one	over	batch	two,	he	does	not	at	the	same	time	select	two	over	one’	(Samuelson	1938:	65).	
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Samuelson	thus	aimed	at	obtaining,	without	mentioning	utility	or	preferences,	 the	same	results	 that	had	
been	achieved	by	Pareto.4	
	 Revealed	preference	 theory	was	 refined	and	developed	 in	various	directions	during	 the	 following	
two	decades,5	and	Samuelson’s	 framework	has	become	a	standard	 tool	 in	advanced	economic	 textbooks	
(e.g.	Mas-Colell	et	al.	1995;	Varian	2005).	But	in	spite	of	its	apparent	success,	the	original	behaviourist	project	
was	never	fully	achieved.	There	are	many	reasons	for	this,	6	but	the	most	fundamental	one	has	to	do	with	its	
narrow	original	scope:	Samuelson’s	revealed	preference	approach	was	meant	to	be	a	contribution	to	riskless	
decision-making.	The	formal	mapping	of	preferences	onto	behaviour	was	attained	in	a	belief-less	context,	in	
other	words,	taking	for	granted	that	consumers	have	perfect	information	about	the	objects	of	choice.	But	if	
the	latter	condition	is	dropped,	it	is	easy	to	demonstrate	that	there	cannot	be	a	one-to-one	correspondence	
between	preference	and	choice.	
Consider	the	following	two	cases:	
	
(a)	Tony	prefers	the	restaurant	Pizza	Vesuvio	to	Pizza	Bella	Napoli.	He	believes	that	Pizza	Vesuvio	is	
closed	tonight.	Therefore,	he	goes	to	Pizza	Bella	Napoli.	
(b)	Vincent	prefers	Pizza	Bella	Napoli	to	Pizza	Vesuvio.	He	believes	that	both	are	open.	Therefore,	he	
goes	to	Pizza	Bella	Napoli.	
	
	 Although	their	choices	are	identical,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	conclude	that	Tony	and	Vince	have	the	
same	preferences.	The	reason	is	that,	in	the	standard	theory	of	economic	choice,	behaviour	is	determined	
both	by	preferences	and	by	beliefs.	As	a	consequence,	the	same	choice	(behaviour)	may	result	from	different	
preferences,	if	beliefs	also	differ.	
	 The	problem	is	ubiquitous.	Tony	may	decide	not	to	contribute	to	the	organisation	of	the	Christmas	
fair	because	he	believes	that	no	one	in	the	neighbourhood	will	give	any	money,	although	he	regrets	that	the	
fair	will	not	take	place.	Vince	in	contrast	does	not	contribute	because	he	hates	Christmas	fairs	and	wouldn’t	
give	any	money	even	if	everyone	else	did.	By	looking	at	their	behaviour	we	cannot	determine	whether	the	
situation	that	each	of	them	is	facing	is	a	public	goods	game,	a	coordination	game,	or	something	else,	because	
we	do	not	know	how	their	choices	depend	on	their	beliefs	about	other	people’s	preferences	and	beliefs.	
	 One	option,	 of	 course,	 is	 to	 add	beliefs	 to	 the	 background	 conditions	 that	 allow	 the	mapping	 of	
                                                
4	 This	behaviourist	interpretation	of	Samuelson’s	project,	which	was	once	majoritarian,	has	been	the	target	of	
sustained	criticism	in	recent	years.	Mongin	(2000a)	for	example	argues	that	Samuelson	never	meant	to	replace	
ordinal	utility	analysis	with	the	theory	of	revealed	preferences,	while	according	to	Moscati	(forthcoming)	he	was	
never	a	committed	behaviourist.	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	revealed	preference	and	
ordinal	utility	theory,	see	also	Cozic	(unpublished). 
5	 See	e.g.	Samuelson	(1948),	Houthakker	(1950),	Afriat	(1967).	Hands	(2013)	proposes	a	useful	taxonomy	of	
different	versions	of	the	revealed	preference	project. 
6	 Caplin	(2008)	explains	why	and	how	the	convergence	of	ordinal	utility	and	revealed	preference	theory	(a	‘paradise	
lost’)	has	collapsed.	For	a	comprehensive	reconstruction	of	the	evolution	of	Samuelson’s	position,	see	Hands	
(2014). 
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preferences	 onto	 choices.	 Such	 a	 move	 is	 eminently	 sensible	 and	 scientifically	 correct,	 but	 defies	 the	
behaviourist	goal:	unless	the	beliefs	are	defined	in	behavioural	terms,	the	revealed	preference	theorist	would	
make	use	of	the	sort	of	psychological	concepts	that	she	intended	to	eliminate	in	the	first	place.	And	exactly	
the	same	argument	holds,	symmetrically,	for	beliefs:	it	is	possible	to	derive	beliefs	from	behaviour	only	if	we	
know	the	preferences	of	decision-makers.	The	behaviourist	is	trapped	in	a	methodological	circle	that	does	
not	have	a	satisfactory	way	out.	
	 This	point	has	been	thoroughly	made	by	Alex	Rosenberg	 (1993),	Dan	Hausman	(2000;	2012),	and	
others,	so	I	will	not	devote	much	time	to	it	here.	Some	economists	have	proposed	interpretations	of	choice	
theory	that	attempt	to	circumvent	the	problem	in	ingenious	ways,	but	none	of	them	is	able	to	recover	the	
behaviourist	programme	without	betraying	its	original	goal.7	Without	informational	input	about	‘primitive’	
variables	 (i.e.,	 variables	 that	 are	 irreducible	 to	 behaviour),	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 theorise	 in	 core	 areas	 of	
economics	such	as	decision	and	game	theory.		
	 An	alternative	strategy	is	to	abandon	radical	behaviourism	and	endorse	a	weaker	interpretation	of	
revealed	preference	theory.	This	weaker	but	more	reasonable	interpretation	has	always	co-habited	with	the	
radical	 behaviourist	 one:	 instead	 of	 claiming	 that	 preferences	 are	 behaviour,	 many	 economists	 take	
Samuelson	 to	 mean	 that	 preferences	 are	 manifested	 in	 behaviour.	 The	 latter	 view	 is	 suggested	 by	
Samuelson’s	use	of	 the	 term	 ‘revealed’,8	 and	 is	 consistent	with	a	moderate	empiricist	 attitude:	 although	
preferences	and	choices	are	different	things,	choice	is	the	empirical	evidence	that	economists	traditionally	
use	to	test	hypotheses	derived	from	beliefs,	desires,	and	option	sets.9	
	 But	 endorsing	 the	moderate	 interpretation	 shifts	 the	 problem	 one	 step	 beyond.	What	 is	 choice	
behaviour	evidence	of?	If	preferences	are	not	patterns	of	choice,	then	what	are	they?	What	is	the	alternative	
to	a	behaviourist	 interpretation?	Does	rejecting	behaviourism	imply	that	we	should	accept	a	 ‘mentalistic’	
interpretation	of	preferences?	
	
3.	The	riddle	of	the	mental	
	
Most	economists	do	not	care	much	about	behaviourism,	to	be	sure.	Contemporary	supporters	of	revealed	
preference	theory	are	more	interested	in	raising	barriers	against	the	intrusion	of	psychology	in	economics,	
than	 in	 reviving	 an	 out-dated	 philosophical	 programme.10	 Most	 of	 them	 however	 share	 a	 common	
                                                
7	 	See	Binmore	(1994),	and	Hausman	(2000;	2012),	Hands	(2013)	for	discussion.	Dietrich	and	List	(2016)	review	and	
discuss	several	other	arguments	against	the	behaviouristic	interpretation	of	preferences.	 
8	 The	terminology	was	introduced	in	Samuelson	(1948).	The	expression	‘revealed	preference’	does	not	even	occur	in	
Samuelson’s	first	(1938)	article. 
9	 This	distinction	between	a	strong	and	weak	form	of	revealed	preference	theory	is	now	entrenched	in	the	
literature:	see	e.g.	Hausman	(2000;	2012),	Hands	(2013),	Dietrich	and	List	(2016),	and,	for	behaviourism	more	
generally,	also	Moore	(2001). 
10	 Gul	and	Pesendorfer	(2008)	are	typical	in	this	respect.	Another	concern	is	to	preserve	the	(alleged)	value-neutrality	
  
6 
presumption,	namely,	that	the	failure	of	behaviourism	would	open	the	doors	to	mentalism	in	economics.	
Terms	 like	 ‘mental’	 and	 ‘psychological’,	 unfortunately,	 are	 often	 used	 differently	 by	 economists,	
psychologists	and	philosophers,	generating	considerable	confusion	in	this	debate.	The	first	step	therefore	is	
to	clarify	what	a	mentalistic	interpretation	of	preference	could	possibly	be.	
	 Most	contemporary	philosophers	have	abandoned	the	idea	that	mental	states	can	be	identified	with	
intrinsic	properties,	such	as	their	experiential	content.	In	contrast,	they	believe	that	mental	states	should	be	
identified	with	the	role	they	play	in	the	aetiology	of	behaviour.	In	a	recent	paper	Franz	Dietrich	and	Christian	
List	describe	this	approach	as	follows:	
	
Mental	states	are,	at	least	in	part,	states	that	play	a	certain	role	for	an	agent.	Beliefs,	for	example,	play	
the	role	of	representing	certain	features	of	the	world	from	the	agent’s	perspective,	and	preferences	
play	 the	 role	 of	 motivating	 the	 agent’s	 actions	 […].	 Functionalism	 is	 the	 view	 that	 what	 makes	
something	a	mental	state	is	simply	that	it	plays	the	relevant	role.	(Dietrich	and	List	2016:	268)11	
	
Functionalism	 (or	 ‘non-reductive	 materialism’,	 as	 it	 is	 sometimes	 called)	 offers	 a	 straightforward	
solution	to	the	problem	of	preferences:	they	are	mental	states	because	they	play	the	‘right’	motivational	role	
in	human	action.	Assuming	a	deflated	notion	of	the	mind,	functionalists	like	Dietrich	and	List	tell	economists	
that,	unknowingly,	they	have	been	talking	about	mental	states	all	along.	
Such	a	 solution	however	 looks	 suspiciously	 simple:	 is	 the	mentalist-behaviourist	 controversy	 really	
based	on	a	 trivial	misunderstanding?	Can	we	 solve	 the	disagreement	merely	by	 redefining	 the	notion	of	
mental	state?	If	mentalism	really	meant	so	little,	why	the	fuss?	Why	do	many	economists	resist	it,	and	why	
do	others	advocate	it	so	fervently?		
	 The	controversy	is	only	partly	terminological.	Of	course	one	can	define	preferences	as	mental	states	
in	 the	 functionalist	 sense,	 but	 the	 terminological	 issue	 has	 some	 important	 substantial	 ramifications.	 A	
functionalist	 definition,	 to	 begin	 with,	 fails	 to	 capture	 the	 reason	 why	 mentalism	 is	 controversial	 in	
economics:	behavioural	economists	do	not	merely	promote	the	reinterpretation	of	a	key	economic	concept	
–	they	advocate	a	robust	injection	of	psychological	theory	and	methods	in	the	economics	of	individual	choice.	
Those	who	resist	this	programme,	in	contrast,	believe	that	the	theory	of	choice	should	be	kept	separate	from	
the	science	of	human	psychology.	In	both	cases	the	debate	concerns	substantial	scientific	issues	rather	than	
conceptual	or	definitional	worries	about	the	mental.	
                                                
of	economic	science;	on	the	interpretation	of	preferences	and	the	normative/positive	uses	of	choice	theory,	see	
e.g.	Hausman	(2012),	Hands	(2013:	sec.	4)	and	Okasha	(2016).	Sen	(1982)	is	the	precursor	of	most	contemporary	
discussions	on	the	use	of	preferences	in	normative	economics. 
11	 	Dietrich	and	List	endorse	a	weak	form	of	functionalism,	according	to	which	playing	a	preference-role	is	indicative,	
rather	than	constitutive,	of	mental	states.	The	main	reason	is	that	mental	states	may	have	other,	non-functional	
characteristics	that	can	only	be	ascertained	from	a	first-personal	perspective.	A	stronger	functionalist	position	is	
defended	by	List	and	Pettit	(2011),	who	take	exclusively	a	third-personal	perspective	on	the	behaviour	of	groups.	
I’m	grateful	to	Franz	Dietrich	and	Christian	List	for	clarifying	this	point. 
  
7 
	 Functionalists	 like	Dietrich	and	List	 take	preference-based	explanations	to	be	distinct	 from	 lower-
level	 explanations	 that	 appeal	 to	 the	 underlying	 realisers	 of	 those	 preferences.	 Although	 I	 share	 this	
fundamental	premise,	I	will	defend	an	alternative	interpretation	of	preference	theory,	based	on	a	different	
conception	of	what	a	science	of	the	mental	(or	a	science	of	psychology)	should	do.	Like	most	economists,	I	
will	take	psychology	to	be	engaged	in	the	explanation	of	human	preferences,	rather	than	in	the	explanation	
of	behaviour	by	means	of	preferences	(which	is	the	specific	task	of	choice	theory).	Moreover,	I	will	argue	that	
no	 psychological	 explanation	 of	 preferences	 is	 likely	 to	 cover	 all	 the	 domains	 in	 which	 choice	 theory	 is	
applied.	
	 I	share	with	Dietrich	and	List	a	broadly	naturalistic	attitude:	any	acceptable	interpretation	of	choice	
theory	must	be	consistent	with	scientific	practice.	Our	disagreement	therefore	stems	partly	from	a	different	
understanding	 of	 the	 mentalist	 project	 in	 economics.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 behavioural	 economists	 and	
psychologists	of	decision	have	not	rejected	economists’	traditional	conception	of	preferences	as	dispositional	
states.	 They	 have	 rather	 challenged	 the	 traditional	 properties	 of	 preference	 rankings,	 and	 have	 tried	 to	
convince	 us	 that	 human	 utility	 functions	 have	 certain	 peculiar	 shapes	 in	 virtue	 of	 certain	 psychological	
mechanisms	that	govern	the	formation	of	human	preferences.	Mentalism	is	first	and	foremost	a	scientific,	
explanatory	project,	rather	than	an	interpretation	of	choice	theory.	
Classic	 functionalism,	 to	 be	 sure,	 was	 also	 rooted	 in	 a	 scientific	 programme.	 The	main	 goal	 of	 this	
programme	–	‘Artificial	Intelligence’	–	was	to	understand	cognition	by	modelling	the	mind	as	a	computational	
device.	A	cognitive	system,	according	to	this	approach,	is	essentially	a	software	that	can	be	implemented	in	
many	different	ways.	The	hardware	does	not	matter	–	there	can	be	minds	made	of	silicon	chips,	vacuum	
tubes,	or	flesh	and	blood.	As	long	as	‘something’	plays	the	right	role	in	their	control	systems,	non-human	
animals,	robots,	plants,	and	aliens	can	be	legitimately	(scientifically)	said	to	have	mental	states.12	
	 Functionalism	 aimed	 at	 convincing	 philosophers	 and	 scientists	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 understand	
complex	cognition	without	‘looking	under	the	hood’.	More	concretely,	it	promised	to	understand	the	mind	
without	a	full	understanding	of	the	way	the	brain	works.	The	software	can	be	studied	independently	of	its	
hardware.	Thus	functionalism	was	motivated	primarily	by	a	methodological,	rather	than	by	an	ontological	
concern.	Methodological	concerns	are	also	at	the	root	of	the	choice	theory	controversy.	But	paradoxically	
they	 are	 the	 flip	 image	of	what	 the	 functionalist	 approach	would	 suggest.	 The	main	 goal	 of	 behavioural	
economists	has	been	to	persuade	social	scientists	that	it	is	important	to	‘look	under	the	hood’	–	that	is,	to	
understand	the	psychological	basis	of	economic	decision-making.	If	there	is	a	methodological	commitment	
behind	mentalism	in	economics,	it	is	exactly	the	opposite	than	the	functionalist’s	commitment	in	AI	and	the	
philosophy	of	mind.	
The	 current	 debate	 in	 economics	 thus	 concerns	 mainly	 the	 role	 that	 psychological	 data	 and	
psychological	explanations	should	play	in	choice	theory.	Advocates	of	the	‘psychologisation’	of	economics	
                                                
12	 For	a	classic	statement,	see	e.g.	the	essays	on	the	mind-body	problem	collected	in	Putnam	(1975). 
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have	 urged	 their	 colleagues	 to	 revise	 the	 Neoclassical	 theory	 of	 choice,	 to	 study	 the	 psychological	
mechanisms	 underlying	 decision-making	 in	 more	 depth,	 and	 to	 make	 extensive	 use	 of	 behavioural	 and	
neuroscientific	experiments.	According	to	Matthew	Rabin,	a	prominent	behavioural	economist,	for	example,	
‘economists	should	aspire	to	make	our	assumptions	about	humans	as	psychologically	realistic	as	possible’	
(2002:	657).	This	programme	is	based	on	a	scientific	gamble:	 that	economic	theory	(and	choice	theory	 in	
particular)	can	be	substantially	improved	by	studying	the	psychology	of	human	decision.	The	gamble	will	pay	
off	if	there	are	indeed	robust	and	systematic	mechanisms	that	help	understand	and	predict	behaviour	more	
accurately	than	the	standard	theory	does.	
But	what	does	this	imply	for	preferences	and	beliefs?	How	are	they	integrated	in	the	new	explanatory	
framework	of	behavioural	economics?	Has	a	new,	psychological	concept	of	preference	emerged	from	the	
psychology	of	decision	making?	Or	has	the	concept	of	preference	remained	unscathed?	In	the	latter	case,	
preferences	would	continue	to	be	used	pretty	much	as	economists	have	always	done.		
This	is	a	scientific,	rather	than	a	definitional	matter.	To	settle	it,	we	must	understand	how	preferences	
are	typically	used	by	choice	theorists,	and	then	see	if	they	are	used	differently	in	behavioural	economics.	The	
next	two	sections	are	devoted	to	this	task.	
	
4.	Explaining	with	preferences	
	
Preferences	provide	information	about	the	relative	attractiveness	of	different	states	of	affairs.	They	explain,	
for	example,	why	Tony	usually	dines	at	Pizza	Vesuvio	rather	than	Bella	Napoli,	but	also	why	he	would	change	
his	 habits	 if	 Vesuvio	were	 to	 charge	 five	 extra	dollars	 for	 his	 favourite	 pizza.	 In	 general,	 preferences	 are	
explanatory	relevant	and	help	formulate	counterfactual	claims	about	future	or	hypothetical	scenarios,	which	
may	inform	the	decisions	of	scientists	and	policy-makers.13	Of	course	preference-based	explanations	are	not	
the	only	game	in	town,	and	compete	with	alternative	explanations	in	the	scientific	arena.	Vince’s	cocaine	
habit	 for	example	escapes	 choice-theoretic	 analysis,	because	 it	 is	 insensitive	 to	 variations	 in	 the	 costs	of	
consumption.14	
	 Even	when	 they	 are	 explanatory,	 however,	 preferences	 do	 not	 provide	 information	 about	many	
interesting	questions.	They	do	not	tell	us,	for	example,	how	–	through	which	causal	mechanism	– a	given	
price	variation	may	affect	Tony’s	behaviour.	They	tell	us	that	A	(an	agent	with	certain	preferences	and	beliefs)	
does	B	(engages	in	a	certain	behaviour)	in	C	(a	set	of	circumstances),	without	saying	exactly	how	B	and	C	are	
                                                
13	 On	explanatory	relevance	and	counterfactual	reasoning	see	e.g.	Woodward	(2004). 
14	 	I	am	simplifying	here:	strictly	speaking	this	would	be	true	only	if	Vince’s	demand	for	cocaine	were	completely	
inelastic,	which	is	rarely	the	case	even	for	drug	addicts	(Hyman	2009).	Many	critics	of	traditional	choice	theory	
focus	on	cases	that	are	conceptually	analogous	to	this:	the	main	effect	of	moral	norms	and	commitments,	for	
example	(Sen	1977),	is	to	make	some	behaviours	(e.g.	honest	dealings)	inelastic	to	variations	in	costs	and	benefits	
(e.g.	bribes).	But	again,	strictly	speaking,	such	cases	fall	outside	the	realm	of	choice	theory	only	in	case	of	complete	
inelasticity. 
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causally	related.	Adopting	a	venerable	terminology,	throughout	the	paper	I	will	say	that	when	a	system	A	has	
a	set	of	causal	properties	such	that,	when	circumstances	C	occur,	A	does	B,	then	A	has	a	disposition	to	do	B	
(in	 C).15	 I	 will	 take	 this	 as	 a	 stipulative	 definition,	 rather	 than	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 everyday	 concept	 of	
disposition.	The	point	is	not	to	solve	an	ancient	philosophical	dispute	about	a	difficult	modal	notion,	but	to	
borrow	a	useful	terminology	that	helps	articulate	the	main	features	of	preference-based	explanations,	and	
show	that	they	share	such	features	with	other	scientific	explanations.		
	 The	set	of	circumstances	C	is	called	the	‘stimulus’	or	‘trigger’	of	B.	For	example,	to	say	that	crystals	
of	NaCl	dissolve	if	you	put	them	in	water	is	equivalent	to	saying	that	salt	is	soluble,	and	water	triggers	the	
dissolution	of	salt.	Thanks	to	modern	chemistry	we	know	quite	a	lot	about	this	process:	roughly,	mixing	NaCl	
with	H2O	causes	the	dissociation	of	NaCl	 into	 ions.	But	knowledge	of	dispositions	can	be	 informative	and	
explanatory	even	if	we	do	not	know	the	details	of	the	underlying	causal	processes.	Thus	when	I	say	that	‘the	
vase	is	fragile’,	I	am	suggesting	that	we	should	handle	it	with	care.	But	knowing	the	causal	process	that	may	
lead	to	the	breaking	of	the	vase	into	little	pieces	is	not	necessary	for	many	pragmatic	and	scientific	purposes.	
	 Dispositional	views	of	preferences	are	traditionally	associated	with	behaviourism.	The	behaviourist	
is	 attracted	 to	 dispositions	 for	 epistemic	 reasons:	 because	 the	 causal	 basis	 is	 partly	 internal	 and	
unobservable,	the	behaviourist	despairs	that	we	will	ever	know	anything	about	it.	If	A,	B,	and	C	only	refer	to	
observable	events	or	states,	then	the	epistemic	worry	disappears.	Unfortunately,	however,	we	have	seen	
that	the	connection	between	choice	and	preferences	in	choice	theory	is	mediated	by	beliefs.	Preferences	are	
‘belief-dependent	dispositions’	 (Hausman	2012:	33),	that	 is,	 the	sort	of	dispositions	that	will	not	help	the	
behaviourist	project,	because	unobservable	states	are	included	in	C.16	
	 Dispositions	however	do	achieve	some	economy	of	thought.	When	it	is	used	to	explain,	a	disposition	
typically	brackets	the	causal	basis	that	connects	C	(the	trigger)	with	B	(the	behaviour).	In	a	single	formula:	
	 	
	 C	[+	causal	basis]	→	B.	
	
	 Bracketing	the	causal	basis	has	advantages	and	limitations.	Starting	from	the	latter,	it	is	obvious	that	
dispositions	are	unfit	to	answer	certain	explanatory	questions.17	As	Molière	pointed	out,	it	is	useless	to	say	
                                                
15	 	I	put	C	between	brackets	because	the	triggering	conditions	are	often	implicit	in	dispositional	terms:	to	say	that	
‘petrol	is	flammable’	simply	means	that	it	burns	at	high	temperatures.	To	simplify	I	am	also	ignoring	ceteris	paribus	
clauses	and	stochastic	causation,	which	are	usually	implicit	in	dispositional	claims	(petrol	burns	upon	reaching	a	
high	temperature,	if	there	is	oxygen	in	the	environment,	and	perhaps	only	with	a	high	probability).	Choi	and	Fara	
(2012)	review	and	discuss	many	of	these	complications. 
16	 	There	is	an	old	tradition	in	philosophy,	going	back	to	Gilbert	Ryle,	that	identifies	mental	states	with	dispositions.	
Since	preferences	in	choice	theory	fulfil	a	similar	role	as	desires	in	folk	psychology,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	
dispositional	accounts	of	preferences	in	the	contemporary	literature	(e.g.	Sugden	1991:	762;	Vanderbeeken	and	
Weber	2002;	Dowding	2002;	Hausman	2012;	Cozic,	unpublished).	Functionalists,	as	we	have	seen,	also	claim	that	
mental	states	like	desires	are	defined	partly	in	terms	of	causal	relations	with	other	mental	states	(e.g.	Block	1980).	
But	since	I	intend	to	argue	that	preferences	are	not	always	or	necessarily	mental	states,	I	will	distinguish	
dispositional	from	functionalist	accounts	of	preferences	here. 
17	 	For	a	detailed	discussion	see	e.g.	Mumford	(1998:	ch.	6). 
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that	opium	has	virtus	dormitiva,	if	the	issue	is	why	opium	makes	you	sleep.	When	the	question	concerns	the	
details	of	the	causal	process,	dispositions	do	not	provide	useful	information.	
However,	dispositional	explanations	have	the	advantage	that	they	allow	to	express	generalisations	
when	the	causal	basis	is	multiply	realisable.	A	causal	basis	is	multiply	realisable	when	a	certain	type	of	event	
triggers	the	same	effect	across	a	range	of	circumstances,	even	though	the	causal	mechanisms	differ	from	
case	 to	 case.	 Since	 economists	 are	 usually	 interested	 in	 the	 explanation	 of	 aggregate	 phenomena,	
dispositional	 explanations	 spare	 them	 the	 trouble	 of	 giving	 extremely	 complicated	 and	 heterogeneous	
descriptions	of	 individual	decision	processes	 (Dowding	2002;	Ross	2005).	But	multiple	 realisation	may	be	
troublesome	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 individuals:	 for	 example,	 suppose	 that	 Tony	 once	 felt	 sick	 after	 eating	
pepperoni	pizza.	Since	then,	he	has	refused	to	eat	it	in	three	separate	occasions:	the	first	time,	Tony	recalled	
the	effects	of	food	poisoning	and	was	driven	instinctively	to	avoid	pepperoni	pizza,	following	a	gut	feeling.	
The	second	time,	Tony’s	stomach	did	not	react	pre-emptively,	but	Tony	deliberated	not	to	eat	pepperoni	
pizza	because	he	remembered	the	food	poisoning.	Finally,	by	the	third	occasion,	Tony	had	developed	a	habit	
to	avoid	pepperoni	pizza	without	even	thinking	about	 it.	 In	spite	of	the	different	causal	mechanisms,	 it	 is	
correct	to	generalise	across	these	cases	and	say	that	Tony	has	a	belief-dependent	disposition	(a	preference)	
for	not	eating	pepperoni	pizza.	
In	order	to	support	useful	generalisations,	dispositions	must	have	some	stable	features.	And	in	fact	
most	 debates	 in	 behavioural	 economics	 concern	 the	 properties	 that	 preferences	 have.	 So,	 even	 though	
knowledge	of	dispositions	does	not	require	knowledge	of	their	causal	basis,	understanding	the	causal	basis	
usually	 helps	 modelling	 the	 dispositions	 correctly.	 The	 more	 information	 we	 have	 about	 the	 causal	
mechanisms	that	are	triggered	by	C,	the	better	we	should	be	able	to	predict	and	explain	the	occurrence	of	B	
across	various	situations.	
	 We	can	thus	distinguish	between	two	explanatory	tasks:	at	one	level,	economists	are	interested	in	
providing	explanations	of	behaviour;	at	another	level,	many	(but	not	all)	economists	believe	that	improving	
such	explanations	requires	that	we	are	also	able	to	explain	preferences.	Another	way	to	put	it	is	to	say	that	
preferences	 are	part	 of	 the	explanans	 (what	does	 the	explaining)	 at	 the	 former	 level,	 but	 constitute	 the	
explanandum	(what	is	to	be	explained)	at	the	latter.	Thus	for	example	preferences	explain	behaviour	in	choice	
theory;	 but	 psychological	mechanisms	 explain	 preferences	 in	 behavioural	 economics.	 Or,	more	 precisely,	
psychological	mechanisms	explain	why	certain	preferences	have	the	shape	that	they	do	have	in	the	models	
of	(behavioural)	choice	theory.	
	
5.	For	example:	Prospect	Theory	
	
The	best	way	to	illustrate	the	difference	between	explanations	of	behaviour	and	explanations	of	preferences	
is	to	examine	a	specific	model,	and	no	model	is	better	suited	for	this	purpose	than	Prospect	Theory.	Prospect	
Theory	was	developed	by	Daniel	Kahneman	and	Amos	Tversky	(1979;	see	also	Tversky	&	Kahneman	1992)	
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with	the	aim	of	systematising	a	large	body	of	experimental	results	produced	by	psychologists	of	decision-
making	during	 the	1960s	and	70s.	The	 two	main	 features	of	Prospect	Theory	–	which	distinguish	 it	 from	
traditional	 models	 of	 rational	 choice	 –	 are	 the	 distortion	 of	 subjective	 probabilities	 (beliefs)	 and	 the	
reference-dependent	utility	function.	Since	preferences	are	the	main	topic	of	this	paper,	I	will	ignore	beliefs	
and	focus	on	the	latter	only.	
	 The	 classic	 shape	 of	 Kahneman	 and	 Tversky’s	 utility	 function	 is	 represented	 in	 Figure	 1.	 The	
intersection	of	the	horizontal	and	vertical	axes	denotes	the	reference	point,	that	is,	the	state	of	affairs	with	
respect	to	which	the	agent	evaluates	the	possible	outcomes	of	her	decision.	 In	many	cases	the	reference	
point	is	simply	the	status	quo.	The	first	 important	idea	behind	Prospect	Theory	is	that	the	same	outcome	
may	be	evaluated	differently	by	the	same	individual	depending	on	whether	it	is	perceived	as	a	gain	or	a	loss	
with	respect	to	the	reference	point.	The	second	idea	is	that	utility	decreases	in	the	domain	of	losses	more	
steeply	than	it	 increases	in	the	domain	of	gains.	The	‘kink’	in	the	shape	of	the	utility	function	reflects	this	
asymmetry	in	the	evaluation	of	gains	and	losses.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Reference-dependent	utility	in	Prospect	Theory	
	
	
Although	 at	 times	 they	 seem	 to	 differentiate	 their	 language	 on	 purpose	 –	 they	 speak	 of	 ‘value	
functions’	instead	of	‘utility	functions’,	for	example	–	in	most	respects	Kahneman	and	Tversky	do	their	best	
to	present	Prospect	Theory	in	the	same	format	as	traditional	choice	theory.18	Its	psychological	content	lies	in	
the	mechanisms	that	determine	the	evaluation	of	prospects,	but	none	of	this	implies	that	the	value	function	
                                                
18	 	The	original	paper	included	an	appendix	with	a	representation	theorem,	for	example.	See	also	Wakker	(2010)	for	
an	attempt	to	integrate	Prospect	Theory	in	the	traditional	conceptual	apparatus	of	economic	theory. 
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must	be	interpreted	psychologically.	The	preferences	of	Prospect	Theory	in	fact	do	not	look	different	from	
those	of	traditional	choice	theory	–	they	describe	belief-dependent	dispositions.	The	principal	difference	is	
that	Prospect	Theory	uses	psychological	information	to	attain	a	more	accurate	representation	of	preferences,	
whereas	traditional	choice	theory	tends	to	sacrifice	realism	in	favour	of	normative	considerations	(its	agents	
are	rational	decision-makers,	first	and	foremost).19	
	 What	is	the	causal	basis	of	preferences	according	to	Prospect	Theory?	Terms	like	‘loss	aversion’	and	
‘reference	dependence’	refer	to	systematic	biases	in	the	evaluation	of	outcomes.20	So	by	looking	at	the	utility	
function	we	cannot	 tell	what	kind	of	psychological	processes	 lie	behind	Prospect	Theory.	Kahneman	and	
Tversky	however	offer	an	 informal	 story	of	how	 the	evaluation	of	prospects	 takes	place:	 in	 the	 so-called	
editing	phase	of	decision,	 the	decision-maker	engages	 in	a	 ‘preliminary	analysis	of	 the	offered	prospects,	
which	 often	 yields	 a	 simpler	 representation	 of	 these	 prospects’	 (1979:	 274).	 The	 peculiar	 shapes	 of	 the	
probability	and	value	 functions	are	generated	at	 this	stage	by	operations	such	as	 ‘coding’,	 ‘combination’,	
‘segregation’	 and	 ‘cancellation’,	 which	 are	 meant	 to	 facilitate	 the	 representation	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	
prospects.	
This	is	roughly	the	psychological	content	of	Prospect	Theory.	Although	the	later	literature	has	made	
other	 contributions	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 utility	 functions,	 such	 contributions	 tend	 to	 fall	 in	 the	 area	 of	
evolutionary	psychology	or	neuroscience,	and	as	such	they	do	not	concern	the	proximate	mechanisms	of	
decision.	 Reference	 dependence	 for	 example	may	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 our	 cognitive	 system	 is	
essentially	 a	 detector	 of	 novelties.21	 New	 events	 convey	 potentially	 important	 information	 regarding	
opportunities	and	risks,	to	which	our	cognitive	apparatus	must	often	react	quickly.	One	cheap	and	dirty	way	
to	do	 it	 is	 to	assess	 their	positive	or	negative	valence	with	 respect	 to	 the	status	quo,	so	as	 to	determine	
promptly	whether	changing	one’s	behaviour	is	worthwhile.	Loss	aversion	–	the	fact	that	the	utility	function	
is	 steeper	 in	 the	domain	of	 losses	–	may	be	explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 losses	and	gains	are	processed	 in	
different	parts	of	the	brain	(Blackford	et	al.	2010).	Losses	tend	to	trigger	negative	emotional	reactions,	and	
the	 ‘loss	 module’	 may	 be	 over-sensitive	 for	 evolutionary	 reasons:	 for	 a	 creature	 living	 in	 a	 dangerous	
environment	and	always	on	 the	brink	of	extinction,	 trying	 to	avoid	 fatal	 losses	may	be	more	 sensible	 (in	
fitness	terms)	than	seeking	uncertain	gains.22	
Although	 such	 explanations	 support	 the	 story	 told	 by	 Kahneman	 and	 Tversky,	 they	 are	 one	 step	
behind	 the	 psychological	 mechanisms	 studied	 by	 behavioural	 economists.	 They	 offer	 evolutionary	 or	
neuroscientific	reasons	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	such	mechanisms,	without	shedding	further	light	on	the	
                                                
19	 On	the	importance	of	normative	principles	in	choice	theory,	see	Sugden	(1991),	Guala	(2000),	Starmer	(2000),	
Okasha	(2016). 
20	 	Some	critics,	in	fact,	have	pointed	out	that	‘several	of	the	explanations	using	heuristics	are	hardly	more	than	
redescriptions	of	the	phenomena’	(Gigerenzer	1991:	99). 
21	 	See	e.g.	Tiitinen	et	al.	(1994),	Corbetta	and	Shulman	(2002). 
22	 	A	piece	of	evidence	in	favour	of	this	hypothesis,	for	example,	is	that	loss	aversion	generally	increases	when	the	
budget	is	small	(Camerer	2005). 
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processes	 leading	 to	 decisions.	 But	 above	 all,	 such	 research	 does	 not	 bear	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	
preferences.	 Nothing	 in	 cognitive	 or	 neuroscience	 forces	 a	 mentalistic	 interpretation	 across	 the	 board:	
although	Kahneman	and	Tversky	explain	why	 individual	human	preferences	have	a	particular	shape,	their	
theory	 is	 compatible	with	 the	 idea	 that	 preferences	 are	 variably	 realised	 across	 different	 decision	 units.	
Moreover,	the	causal	basis	of	some	preferences,	in	some	collective	organisations	and	non-human	organisms,	
may	 not	 be	 psychological	 in	 any	 interesting	 sense	 of	 the	 term.	 In	 the	 next	 section	we	will	 examine	 two	
decision	units	that	display	similar	preference	patterns	for	completely	different	reasons.	But	only	in	one	case,	
as	we	shall	see,	the	causal	basis	is	psychological	in	an	interesting	sense	of	the	term.	
	
6.	When	the	causal	basis	varies:	intransitive	preferences	
	
The	 rejection	 of	 mentalism	 is	 based	 on	 a	 distinction	 between	 different	 levels	 of	 explanation.	 And	 the	
distinction	between	levels	is	justified	by	multiple	realisability:	if	the	causal	basis	of	preferences	differs	across	
decision	units,	different	types	of	explanation	may	be	in	order	for	different	domains	of	application	of	choice	
theory.	But	multiple	realisability,	of	course,	is	an	empirical	matter:	the	causal	bases	of	preferences	may	or	
may	not	be	psychological,	in	each	particular	case.	Tony’s	dislike	of	pepperoni	pizza	was	prompted	in	one	case	
by	an	emotional	reaction,	another	time	by	deliberate	reasoning,	and	the	third	time	by	an	 ingrained	habit	
that,	presumably,	must	be	encoded	in	his	brain.23	In	this	case,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	any	reason	to	deny	
that	preferences	are	psychological	dispositions.	But	in	other	cases,	the	same	conclusion	is	not	warranted	at	
all.	
	 I	 will	 proceed	 again	 by	 way	 of	 an	 example.	 Experimental	 and	 behavioural	 economists	 have	
demonstrated	convincingly	that	preferences	may	be	intransitive	in	some	circumstances,	and	have	described	
various	mechanisms	that	may	explain	these	intransitive	patterns.	One	mechanism	was	identified	a	long	time	
ago	by	Tversky	and	other	choice	theorists	working	on	so-called	‘multi-attribute’	utility	functions.	Imagine	a	
decision	 maker	 facing	 a	 choice	 between	 three	 options	 labelled	 X,	 Y,	 and	 Z.	 Each	 option	 moreover	 is	
characterised	by	three	attributes.	The	options	and	the	attributes	may	be	anything	that	the	decision	maker	
cares	about,	but	to	make	the	example	concrete	let	us	suppose	that	the	choice	concerns	three	types	of	car	
characterised	by	different	degrees	of	comfort,	speed,	and	price.	Now,	let	us	suppose	that	the	cars	(X,	Y,	Z)	
are	ranked	on	each	dimension	or	characteristic	as	follows:	
	
1.	Comfort:	X>Y>Z.	
2.	Speed:	Z>X>Y.	
3.	Price:	Y>Z>X.	
                                                
23	 	Some	contemporary	attempts	to	identify	‘utility	in	the	brain’	are	probably	based	on	this	sort	of	reasoning.	If	not	in	
the	mind/brain,	where	could	utility	possibly	be?	See	e.g.	Glimcher	et	al.	(2005),	and	–	for	a	critical	perspective	–	
Vromen	(2010),	Fumagalli	(2013). 
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	 The	>	symbol	stands	for	a	(transitive)	‘more-than’	relation:	for	example,	along	the	first	dimension	car	
X	is	more	comfortable	than	Y,	which	is	more	comfortable	than	Z.	Now,	since	no	car	is	better	than	the	others	
in	 all	 respects,	 the	 decision-maker	 faces	 the	 problem	 of	 weighing	 each	 attribute	 and	 aggregating	 the	
evaluations	 to	 form	a	 single	preference	 ranking.	 This	 task	may	be	 cognitively	quite	demanding,	 so	when	
presented	 with	 pairwise	 choices	 people	 tend	 to	 use	 a	 simple	 heuristic	 instead	 of	 working	 through	 the	
aggregation	procedure.	The	heuristic	goes	as	 follows:	whenever	you	have	to	make	a	decision	among	two	
options,	choose	the	one	that	beats	the	other	along	most	dimensions.	Applied	to	this	particular	case,	the	rule	
would	give	the	following	outcomes:	
	
X	beats	Y	in	comfort	and	speed,	but	loses	in	price.	
Y	beats	Z	in	comfort	and	price,	but	loses	in	speed.	
Z	beats	X	in	speed	and	price,	but	loses	in	comfort.	
	
	 Using	this	simple	heuristic	would	generate	intransitive	preferences:	X	is	preferred	to	Y,	Y	is	preferred	
to	Z,	but	Z	is	preferred	to	X.24	
	 The	mechanism	 behind	 preference	 formation,	 in	 this	 example,	 is	 clearly	 psychological:	 the	main	
reason	to	use	the	simple	rule	is	to	save	cognitive	effort.	Each	one	of	us	can	appreciate	the	lure	of	this	heuristic	
by	introspection,	and	experiments	(e.g.	Tversky	1972)	have	demonstrated	that	human	decision-makers	have	
a	 tendency	 to	 engage	 in	 mono-dimensional	 evaluation	 before	 (or	 instead	 of)	 aggregating	 across	 the	
attributes.	 A	mentalistic	 interpretation	 of	 the	 causal	 basis	 of	 preferences	 in	 this	 case	 is	 empirically	 and	
theoretically	warranted.	
	 It	is	easy	however	to	find	examples	of	intransitive	preferences	that	are	not	based	on	a	psychological	
mechanism	of	this	sort.	For	ease	of	comparison,	let	us	examine	a	case	that	is	formally	similar	to	the	previous	
one:	a	university	hiring	committee	must	decide	how	to	rank	three	candidates	(Dr	Smith,	Dr	Brown,	and	Dr	
Jones)	for	an	academic	position.	The	committee	is	constituted	by	three	members,	who	rank	the	candidates	
as	follows:	
	
1.	Smith	>	Jones	>	Brown.	
2.	Brown	>	Smith	>	Jones.	
3.	Jones	>	Brown	>	Smith.	
	
Now,	let	us	suppose	that	according	to	university	rules	the	winner	must	be	determined	via	a	selection	process	
that	involves	a	sequence	of	pairwise	comparisons,	and	that	each	comparison	must	be	resolved	by	majority	
                                                
24	 For	a	classic	experimental	study	of	this	phenomenon,	see	May	(1954).	Other	excellent	discussions	of	intransitivity	
can	be	found	in	Tversky	(1969)	and	Mongin	(2000b). 
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voting.	When	presented	with	pairwise	options,	the	committee	votes	as	follows:	
	
Smith	beats	Jones	2-1.	
Jones	beats	Brown	2-1.	
Brown	beats	Smith	2-1.	
	
This	 is	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 ‘Condorcet	 voting’,	 a	 problem	 that	 has	 been	 discussed	 extensively	 in	 choice	
theory.25	 Condorcet	 voting	 is	 a	 case	 of	 intransitivity	 generated	 by	 voting	 rules.	 A	 non-psychological	
mechanism	here	produces	a	peculiar	pattern	of	preferences.	Although	formally	analogous,	the	mechanism	
thus	 is	 substantially	 different	 from	 the	 one	 that	 explains	 intransitivity	 in	multi-attribute	 choice.	 The	 first	
difference	is	that	the	decision-maker	is	an	organization	rather	than	an	individual	human	being.	The	second	
one	is	that	intransitive	preferences	are	generated	by	an	institutional	rule,	rather	than	by	a	heuristic.26	Any	
attempt	 to	 fix	 the	problem,	 therefore,	should	better	 take	this	 fact	 into	account:	 the	committee	does	not	
suffer	 from	 bounded	 rationality,	 does	 not	 follow	 fast-and-frugal	 heuristics,	 and	 transitivity	 cannot	 be	
restored	by,	say,	changing	the	way	in	which	the	options	are	framed.	An	effective	intervention	must	target	
the	institutional	environment,	for	example	the	rules	that	force	the	committee	to	follow	a	pairwise,	majority-
voting	procedure.	
	 It	is	important	to	realise	that	this	is	not	an	odd	application	of	choice	theory.	Although	the	theory	was	
originally	developed	to	explain	the	behaviour	of	individual	human	beings,	economists	and	other	behavioural	
scientists	use	it	routinely	to	explain	and	predict	the	choices	of	other	decision	units.	We	know	that	mice	and	
crabs	have	preferences	–	in	the	genuine	sense	of	the	term	–	because	we	can	find	their	indifference	points	by	
varying	costs	and	benefits	and	observing	that	their	behaviour	changes	in	a	systematic	manner.	If	laboratory	
mice	are	made	to	work	to	obtain	different	types	of	water,	for	example,	their	behaviour	fits	a	well-defined	
demand	curve	(Holm	et	al.	2007).	If	hermit	crabs	are	given	electric	shocks,	they	are	more	reluctant	to	leave	
a	good	shell	than	a	poor	quality	one	(Appel	and	Elwood	2009).	Even	jellyfish,	according	to	marine	biologists,	
have	a	control	centre	that	‘coordinates	responding	when	stimuli	are	tending	to	elicit	more	than	one	response’	
(Albert	2001:	474).	
	 And	 if	 these	 applications	 seem	 marginal,	 consider	 traditional	 analyses	 of	 consumers’	 choice:	
economists	 are	 perfectly	 comfortable	 to	 apply	 choice	 theory	 to	 explain	 the	 consumption	 patterns	 of	
households.	 And	 they	 are	 well	 aware	 that	 the	 preferences	 of	 a	 household	 may	 be	 irreducible	 to	 the	
preferences	 of	 its	 individual	 members.	 Thus,	 for	 example,	 sea	 and	 mountain	 resorts	 are	 perfectly	
complementary	 in	the	utility	function	of	Vince’s	family.	This	property	does	not	reflect	anyone’s	 individual	
                                                
25	 See	e.g.	Farquharson	(1969),	List	and	Pettit	(2011). 
26	 There	are,	of	course,	psychological	elements	in	the	causal	chain	that	leads	to	the	committee’s	preference	structure	
(such	as	the	evaluations	of	the	individual	committee	members).	But	such	psychological	elements	cannot	explain	
the	intransitivity	of	preferences	–	not,	at	least,	without	a	lot	of	help	from	the	institutional	rules	(see	also	Ross	
2005;	2014). 
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preferences	 –	 Vince	 prefers	 mountains,	 Margie	 prefers	 sea	 –	 and	 cannot	 be	 explained	 psychologically.	
Rather,	Vince	and	his	family	have	decided	to	adopt	a	simple	rule:	to	make	everyone	happy,	they	spend	half	
of	their	holidays	in	the	mountains	and	the	other	half	on	the	beach.	
	 One	may	worry	at	this	point	that	we	are	injecting	an	odd	asymmetry	in	choice-theoretic	explanations:	
why	should	we	take	only	one	of	the	partners	that	explain	and	justify	choices	to	be	mental,	and	not	the	other?	
The	worry	however	seems	unjustified:	the	beliefs	of	committees,	robots,	and	non-human	organisms	can	also	
be	 interpreted	 in	 a	non-mentalistic	 fashion.	 For	 example,	 the	 information	 that	 is	 available	 to	 a	 selection	
committee	–	in	the	form	of	CVs,	letters	of	reference,	and	interviews	–	may	influence	its	decisions,	without	
being	 identical	 to	 the	 psychological	 states	 of	 the	 committee	 members.	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 the	
information	should	be	treated	(represented,	stored,	 revised)	 in	a	way	that	satisfies	 the	 laws	of	 individual	
human	psychology:	the	weight	accorded	to	a	piece	of	 information,	for	example,	may	depend	on	strategic	
coalition-formation	among	the	committee	members	or	on	 institutional	 rules	 that	determine	 its	eligibility,	
rather	than	on	its	salience,	availability,	or	the	cognitive	limitations	of	the	committee	members.27	To	sum	up:	
the	causal	basis	of	beliefs,	preferences,	and	the	way	in	which	they	interact	is	not	always,	or	not	even	typically,	
constituted	by	psychological	processes.		
	 A	committed	functionalist	may	still	insist	that	there	is	no	reason	to	identify	mental	states	narrowly	
with	 human	mental	 states,	 and	 psychology	with	 human	psychology.	 Following	 List	 and	 Pettit	 (2011),	 for	
example,	one	may	want	to	extend	mentalism	to	corporate	agents.	But	this	move	depends	on	the	existence	
of	 a	 science	 of	 the	 mental	 that	 is	 able	 to	 provide	 unifying	 explanations	 of	 the	 preferences	 of	 human	
individuals,	social	groups,	crabs,	robots,	and	other	decision	unit	that	falls	in	the	domain	of	choice	theory.	As	
things	stand,	it	seems	unlikely	that	a	single	theory	will	be	able	to	account	for	the	causal	basis	of	preferences	
across	such	a	wide	domain.	This	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	economists	prefer	to	be	non-committal	about	the	
nature	of	preferences.	A	functionalist	mentalism	may	seem	appealing	to	philosophers,	but	would	be	largely	
irrelevant	for	scientific	practice.	
	
7.	Taking	stock	
	
The	 controversy	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 utility	 and	 preferences	 is	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 debates	 in	 the	
foundations	 of	 economics.	 Its	 resilience	 is	 due	 to	 an	 unresolved	 tension	 between,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
economists’	 aspiration	 to	 theorise	 at	 a	 different	 level	 from	 psychology,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 fact	 that	
psychological	evidence	has	been	an	important	source	of	information	to	build	modern	microeconomic	theory.	
This	has	become	particularly	evident	during	the	last	three	decades,	since	the	rise	of	behavioural	economics	
has	led	to	the	development	of	psychologically-informed	models	of	choice.	
Seen	in	this	light,	the	resistance	against	mentalism	may	appear	all	the	more	obsolete.	Nonetheless,	I	
                                                
27	 	While	serving	as	members	of	hiring	committees,	most	of	us	have	heard	the	expression	‘unfortunately,	we	cannot	
consider	this	information’	or	‘we	cannot	include	it	in	the	candidate’s	file’. 
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have	argued	that	the	notion	of	preference	is	used	in	choice	theory	–	including	behavioural	choice	theory	–	in	
a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 compel	 a	 psychological	 interpretation.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 preferences	 are	 (belief-
dependent)	dispositional	 terms	with	a	multiply	 realisable	causal	basis.	Because	 they	are	belief-dependent	
dispositions,	behaviourism	fails.	But	because	they	are	multiply	realisable,	mentalism	does	not	hold.	When	
the	causal	basis	of	preferences	is	institutional	(as	in	the	case	of	organisations),	bio-physical	(as	in	jellyfish),	
or	mechanical	(as	in	robots),	standard	psychological	explanations	are	unable	to	shed	light	on	the	causal	basis	
and	the	shape	of	preferences.			
The	argument	hinges	on	a	disambiguation	of	the	term	‘mental’:	for	most	economists	it	denotes	the	
realm	of	phenomena	and	processes	studied	by	the	psychology	of	human	decision.28	This	is	often	a	cause	of	
misunderstanding,	for	philosophers	tend	to	use	the	term	in	a	different,	more	technical	way.	Functionalists,	
for	example,	would	agree	with	the	main	premise	of	the	argument	(preferences	are	dispositions)	but	would	
take	it	to	corroborate	rather	than	to	refute	mentalism.	As	I	have	argued	in	section	three,	this	is	not	merely	a	
terminological	 quibble.	 The	 functionalist	 interpretation	 casts	 a	 shadow	 of	 mystery	 on	 the	 controversy	
sparked	 by	 the	mentalistic	 interpretation.	 The	mystery	 disappears	 once	we	 realise	 that	 the	 controversy	
concerns	the	relationship	between	different	scientific	programmes	and	explanatory	frameworks	within	the	
sciences	of	behaviour.	Anti-mentalists	in	economics	avoid	the	identification	of	choice	theory	with	psychology	
in	order	to	distinguish	between	different	explanatory	tasks,	and	to	make	its	application	possible	in	a	wider	
domain.	This	is	the	main	reason	why	they	remain	non-committal	about	the	causal	basis	of	preferences.	
In	some	circumstances,	especially	 in	the	traditional	domain	of	human	decision-making,	the	causal	
basis	 is	 indeed	mainly	 constituted	 by	 psychological	mechanisms.	 The	 dispositional	 interpretation	 in	 such	
cases	clarifies	how	economists	and	cognitive	scientists	collaborate,	indicating	a	natural	division	of	labour	and	
providing	a	common	language	for	the	construction	of	psychologically-informed	models	of	choice.29	But	 in	
other	cases	the	basis	is	not	psychological	in	any	interesting,	scientific	sense	of	the	term.	This	explains	why	
some	economists	resist	the	narrow	identification	of	choice	theory	with	the	psychology	of	decision-making.	
The	latter	is	not	an	unscientific	or	a	conservative	position.	Like	‘force’	in	physics,	‘preference’	is	an	
abstract	concept	that	must	be	filled	with	content	in	each	specific	domain	of	application.	Like	physical	forces,	
we	have	good	reasons	to	believe	that	preferences	are	real	explanatory	variables.	But	what	they	are,	exactly,	
is	something	that	science	–	not	philosophy	–	will	tell.	To	discover	how	many	kinds	of	force	there	are,	and	how	
they	 work,	 has	 been	 an	 important	 task	 in	 the	 history	 of	 physics.	 Similarly,	 the	 mechanisms	 underlying	
preferences	are	potentially	heterogeneous	and	new	ones	may	be	discovered	with	the	development	of	social	
                                                
28	 	Gul	and	Pesendorfer	(2008)	adopt	a	narrower	interpretation,	suggesting	that	‘mental’	is	synonymous	with	
‘neural’.	This	is	a	misleading	choice	of	terminology,	for	it	seems	to	deny	the	possibility	of	theorising	at	a	higher	
level	than	brain	states	and	processes	–	which	is	what	most	behavioural	economists	and	economic	psychologists	
do.	On	this	point,	see	also	Dietrich	and	List	(2016:	276). 
29	 	Arguably,	behavioural	economics	is	committed	not	only	to	study	the	psychological	basis	of	economic	behaviour,	
but	also	to	translate	its	findings	in	the	language	of	economic	theory. 
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science.	
This	is	not	a	reductionist	position	either,	from	a	metaphysical	or	methodological	point	of	view.	One	
may	refuse	to	 identify	preferences	with	specific	psychological	states	and	at	the	same	time	recognise	that	
they	are	genuine	(i.e.	causally	effective)	explanatory	variables.30	The	point	is	that	as	dispositions	they	may	
have	different	properties	depending	on	the	type	of	decision	unit:	their	causal	basis	is	likely	to	differ	across	
domains.	A	deeper	explanation,	as	mentioned	in	section	four,	is	not	always	necessary	or	even	useful	for	many	
practical	and	scientific	purposes.	But	any	attempt	to	explain	preferences	(why	the	preferences	of	a	university	
committee	have	a	certain	shape,	for	example,	while	those	of	a	mobster	have	another)	will	most	likely	draw	
upon	theoretical	and	methodological	resources	that	are	suited	to	the	specific	causal	basis	of	each	domain.	
‘Sociology	for	committees,	engineering	for	robots,	and	psychology	for	humans’,	may	be	the	slogan	of	this	
paper.	
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